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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS




CHEN THIEN LIM 
and RUBIN WIJAYA,
                  Petitioners
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
                                                                                   Respondent
_____________________
Petition for Review of an Order of the
United States Department of Justice
Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA Nos. A95-149-659 and A95-149-660)
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Charles M. Honeyman
______________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 1, 2008
Before:    RENDELL, GREENBERG, and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges
(Filed: May 5, 2008)
___________
OPINION OF THE COURT
___________
PER CURIAM
Petitioners Chen Thien Lim and Ruben Wijaya seek review of a final order by the
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”).  For the reasons that follow, we will dismiss their
2petition in part and deny it in part.
I.  Background
Petitioners, a married couple, are ethnic Chinese Christian natives and citizens of
Indonesia.  Petitioners entered the United States in 2000 and remained unlawfully after
the expiration of their non-immigrant visas.  They were charged with removal in 2001 and
applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against
Torture (“CAT”).  After several hearings, the IJ issued an oral decision on December 15,
2005.  Although he found Petitioners credible, he held that they failed to meet their
burdens of proof and persuasion.  He denied the applications for asylum, withholding of
removal, and protection under the CAT and granted the applications for voluntary
departure.  Petitioners appealed to the BIA, which affirmed the IJ’s decision and
dismissed their appeal.  This petition for review followed.
II.  Due Process
As an initial matter, Petitioners claim the IJ failed to meaningfully review their
objective evidence, including two 2004 State Department reports, in violation of their due
process rights.  See Sewak v. INS, 900 F.2d 667, 671 (3d Cir. 1990).  In response, the
Government argues that Petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies by first
seeking relief from the BIA for the alleged due process violation.  See Bonhometre v.
Gonzales, 414 F.3d 442, 447 (3d Cir. 2005).
Whether Petitioners were required to exhaust administrative remedies depends
3upon the nature of their claim.  Generally, constitutional claims are beyond the BIA’s
jurisdiction and not subject to the exhaustion requirement.  Bonhometre, 414 F.3d at 448
n.7.  However, there is an exception for due process claims asserting a procedural error
that could have been corrected by the BIA.  Khan v. Atty. Gen’l of the United States, 448
F.3d 226, 236 (3d Cir. 2006).  
Here, Petitioners claim the IJ failed to make an individualized determination of
their claims.  See Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 549 (3d Cir. 2001).  Petitioners
should have presented this argument to the BIA so the BIA could have considered
whether to remand to the IJ to remedy the alleged procedural flaw.  See Bonhometre, 414
F.3d at 447-48.  Because they did not, we lack jurisdiction to review this aspect of the
petition.  Id. at 448.
III.  Asylum
An asylum applicant must demonstrate past persecution or a well-founded fear of
future persecution.  See Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 2002).  This is a
factual determination, which we review under the substantial evidence standard.  Gao,
299 F.3d at 272.  To grant relief, “we must find that the evidence not only supports that
conclusion [that Petitioners’ applications should have been granted], but compels it.”  INS
v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1 (1992) (emphasis in original).  Where, as here,
the BIA adopted the IJ’s findings and discussed some of the bases for the IJ’s decision,
we review both decisions.  See Chukwu v. Atty. Gen’l of the United States, 484 F.3d 185,
4189 (3d Cir. 2007); Xie v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 239, 242 (3d Cir. 2004). 
A.  Past Persecution
First, Petitioners argue that the IJ erred in finding that they did not suffer past
persecution.  We have adopted a narrow definition of persecution, which “connotes
extreme behavior, including ‘threats to life, confinement, torture, and economic
restrictions so severe that they constitute a threat to life or freedom.’” Ahmad v. Ashcroft,
341 F.3d 214, 217 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1240).  We do not recognize
as persecution “isolated incidents that do not result in serious injury.”  Voci v. Gonzales,
409 F.3d 607, 615 (3d Cir. 2005). 
Petitioners testified that they experienced general incidents of discrimination and
harassment throughout their childhoods.  They also described a few specific individual
incidents of violence, crime, and harassment, including:
C In 1991, Lim and her father were threatened and robbed by native
Indonesians shouting racial insults.
C In 1998, Lim was harassed, insulted based on her race, chased, and
assaulted.  When attempting to run away, she fell and suffered a head
injury.
C In 1998, while her family was attempting to move to a new neighborhood,
native Indonesians threatened and shouted racial slurs at them and coerced
Lim’s family into giving them money.
C In 1997, Indonesians burned down Wijaya’s aunt’s antique shop.   
C Because his father was a Christian pastor, Muslim neighbors threw stones
and feces at Wijaya’s house and defaced his father’s church.  
5In addition, Petitioners testified to generalized episodes of violence against ethnic
Chinese Christians in Indonesia, including rioting in 1998 and church bombings from
1994 to 2000.
A reasonable adjudicator would not be compelled to conclude that these incidents
were sufficiently severe to constitute persecution.  See Lie, 396 F.3d at 536.  In Lie, we
held that isolated criminal acts resulting in property theft and a minor injury did not
qualify.  Id.  Similarly, Petitioners described a small number of isolated events which did
not result in serious injury.  Although Petitioners argue that their claims are
distinguishable from Lie, we cannot say that their cumulative experiences varied
sufficiently from those in Lie so as to compel an adjudicator to conclude that Petitioners
suffered persecution.  See Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1240.   
B.  Future Persecution
Petitioners also attempted to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. 
Both the IJ and BIA held that Petitioners did not succeed.  Petitioners now contend that
the IJ inappropriately failed to review current country conditions in Indonesia to
determine whether a pattern or practice of persecution of Chinese Christians exists. 
Petitioners were required to demonstrate a “pattern or practice of persecution of a
group of persons similarly situated to the applicant. . . .”  8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(2). 
Petitioners proffered two 2004 State Department reports concerning the treatment of
ethnic Chinese Christians in Indonesia.  See A.R. 0098-139.  The IJ considered the
     For example, the 2004 State Department Country Report on Human Rights Practices1
states, “[t]he Government [of Indonesia] officially promotes racial and ethnic tolerance. . .
.  Instances of discrimination and harassment of ethnic Chinese Indonesians declined
compared with previous years.”  A.R. 0122.  Similarly, while the 2004 State Department
Report on International Religious Freedom discusses instances of inter-religious violence
between Christians and Muslims in Indonesia, A.R. 0134-36, it also notes that “[s]ome
notable advances in interreligious tolerance and cooperation occurred . . . [and]
Government officials together with Muslim and Christian community leaders continued
to work together to diffuse tensions in conflict areas. . . .”  A.R. 0128.
     Petitioners also sought withholding of removal pursuant to INA § 241(b)(3)(A) [82
U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A)].  The bar is higher for demonstrating eligibility for withholding
of removal than for asylum.  See Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 469-70 (3d Cir.
2003).  Because Petitioners failed to demonstrate past persecution or a well founded fear
6
reports.  See A.R. 0058.  Although he expressed concerns over the treatment of Chinese
Christians in Indonesia, he held that, in light of the relevant case law – including our
decision in Lie, 396 F.3d 530, and the BIA’s decision in In re A-—, 23 I&N Dec. 737
(BIA 2005) – the evidence did not support a pattern or practice finding.  A.R. 0058.  
We have not conclusively addressed whether a pattern or practice of persecution of
ethnic Chinese Christians in Indonesia exists at the present time.  See Sukwanputra v.
Gonazles, 434 F.3d 627, 637 n.10 (3d Cir. 2006).  We note that in contrast to Lie, where
the applicant presented a 1999 State Department report, Petitioners presented two 2004
State Department reports.  However, the IJ could reasonably conclude that the 2004 State
Department reports do not reflect a pattern or practice of persecution of ethnic Chinese
Christians in Indonesia.   Because the evidentiary record does not compel a contrary1
conclusion, see Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 481 n.1, the decision rests upon substantial
evidence.2
of future persecution for asylum purposes, it follows that they also failed meet the more
rigorous standard for withholding of removal.  Id.
7
IV.  Convention Against Torture
To qualify for protection under the CAT, Petitioners were required to show by a
preponderance of objective evidence that they would be tortured if removed to Indonesia. 
See Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 174-75 (3d Cir. 2002).  Petitioners point to no
evidence that compels us to reverse the IJ’s and BIA’s finding that they failed to
demonstrate eligibility for protection under the CAT.  
V.  Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition in part and dismiss it in part.
